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ABSTRACT
Policy-agnostic programming on the client-side
by Kushal Palesha
Browser security has become a major concern especially due to web pages becoming
more complex. These web applications handle a lot of information, including sensitive
data that may be vulnerable to attacks like data exfiltration, cross-site scripting (XSS),
etc. Most modern browsers have security mechanisms in place to prevent such attacks
but they still fall short in preventing more advanced attacks like evolved variants
of data exfiltration. Moreover, there is no standard that is followed to implement
security into the browser.
A lot of research has been done in the field of information flow security that
could prove to be helpful in solving the problem of securing the client-side. Policy-
agnostic programming is a programming paradigm that aims to make implementation
of information flow security in real world systems more flexible. In this paper, we
explore the use of policy-agnostic programming on the client-side and how it will help
prevent common client-side attacks. We verify our results through a client-side salary
management application. We show a possible attack and how our solution would
prevent such an attack.
Keywords Information flow security, policy-agnostic programming, faceted values
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The rapid increase in the number of applications that collect and process private
data has made prevention of data leaks an involving task for security professionals. It
is hard enough protecting against attacks on web servers, we now have sophisticated
web applications that do more than just display static information received from the
server. Javascript is the language of choice to develop these dynamic web pages, but
there is lot of fragmentation in the Javascript engines used by different browsers,
so if one browser may prevent some form of attack, we cannot assume that another
browser may prevent the same form of attack.
In this paper, we propose the introduction of policy-agnostic programming (PAP)
into Javascript to help protect sensitive data on the client-side. PAP is a programming
paradigm introduced by Yang et al. [1] that builds on research efforts in language
based information flow security. In their paper, Yang et al. introduced Jeeves, a
language to write policy-agnostic programs. The PAP paradigm aims to make the
implementation of information flow controls in complex real world systems flexible
and intuitive. Yang et al. [2] presented how PAP can be used to protect data on
a database backed server. They introduced an MVC framework called Jacqueline,
which extends the Django framework [3] with Jeeves for policy-agnostic evaluation.
Similarly, we will extend Javascript to support PAP and demonstrate how it can help
prevent sensitive data leaks on the browser.
In the rest of this chapter we give a survey of the current state of browser security,
proposals to protect against various client-side attacks and where our solution would
fit into the client-side architecture. In Chapter 2 we give a brief background about
information flow security, policy-agnostic programming, Jeeves, and related concepts.
In Chapter 3 we review our solution, provide details of our implementation, and show
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a sample application. In the final chapter we conclude.
1.1 Efforts to secure browser content
Ever since the first web browser was introduced [4] in 1990, the kind of content
rendered has evolved dramatically. First it was only static html pages that were
acquired from web servers. The introduction of the Common Gateway Interface (CGI)
in 1993 [5], added the capability of generating dynamic web pages based on client
requests made by the web browser. "Dynamic" here was pages that were created
by web servers based on user requests and hence served personalized content that
may include sensitive data. This meant there was content worth protecting, but even
then most of the security measures were focused on the server-side (where all the
data resided) since that was where attackers also focused their attention. With the
introduction of Javascript in 1995 [6] web browsers became really powerful since it
enabled web developers to create web pages with client-side interactivity without the
need to make requests to a web server.
With further iterations of Javascript and the technologies around it, web pages
have now evolved into web applications giving great control over sensitive user
data to the client-side. The flexibility of Javascript that makes it possible to develop
sophisticated web applications also makes content rendered by web browsers vulnerable
to attacks. Over the years browser vendors have come up with various security
measures to protect browser content.
1.1.1 Common security measures found in most modern browsers
Flanagan [7, Section 13.6] talks about browser security in brief and states two
competing goals that browser vendors have tried to balance: ‘‘Defining powerful
client-side APIs to enable useful web applications.’’ and ‘‘Preventing malicious code
from reading or altering your data, compromising your privacy, scamming you, or
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wasting your time.’’ Flanagan [7, Section 13.6.1] lists some of the common security
restrictions imposed on Javascript and notes that ‘‘Different browsers have different
security policies and may implement different API restrictions.’’.
Same-origin policy
‘‘The same-origin policy restricts how a document or script loaded from
one origin can interact with a resource from another origin. It is a critical
security mechanism for isolating potentially malicious documents.’’ [8]
The article [8] gives details about how the same-origin policy controls Javascript
behavior for different scenarios like cross-origin network access (control http requests
or resource embedding tags), cross-origin script API access (limit access to Window
and Location objects) and cross-origin data storage access. The same origin policy
is very broad in terms of what it controls primarily because it needs to keep the
flexibility that Javascript is known for. Flanagan [7, Section 13.6.2] has more details
about the same origin policy and lists some techniques of how the same origin policy
can be relaxed in some cases (read Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) [9]).
Content Security Policy
‘‘Content Security Policy (CSP) is an added layer of security that helps
to detect and mitigate certain types of attacks, including Cross Site Script-
ing (XSS) and data injection attacks. These attacks are used for everything
from data theft to site defacement or distribution of malware.’’ [10]
In CSP, inline scripts are disabled by default, which would automatically prevent
code injection based attacks. Additionally, CSP also allows a server administrator to
restrict what sources a web page can import executable scripts from. On the face of
it, CSP seems to provide a robust mechanism to prevent XSS and data exfiltration
attacks.
1.1.2 Arguments against common browser security mechanisms
The security mechanisms mentioned above are implemented in all modern
browsers to help prevent sensitive data leaks among other security breaches but
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they are not foolproof solutions as presented by several researchers:
• Chen et al. [11] present cases where the same-origin policy falls short in protecting
sensitive data from a particular form of the data-exfiltration attack. They define
a data-exfiltration attack as:
‘‘an attack where the adversary exports user’s private data to
a server controlled by the attacker, possibly using a code injection
vulnerability.’’
This form of attack would be prevented by the same origin policy. The authors
present self-exfiltration as a new ‘‘class’’ of the data-exfiltration attack. In this
form of attack, the injected script does not directly send the extracted data to an
attacker-controlled server; instead it is posted to another location of the victim
website itself or to whitelisted origins. The attacker can later log-on/access the
victim website or whitelisted site respectively to retrieve the information.
• Acker et al. [12] present a strong case arguing the failure of CSP to prevent data
exfiltration. They show that even the strongest CSP policies can be circumvented
using DNS and resource prefetching as data exfiltration techniques.
The researchers above reveal flaws in existing browser security mechanisms and suggest
possible improvements to fix them. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter,
all browsers are not created equal and so maybe a couple of browser vendors may
implement one of the suggested solutions. But this would mean the vulnerability
would still exist in the rest of the browsers until said solution becomes a standard
and all the vendors adopt it. Moreover, these are just some examples of the many
loopholes that researchers (and unfortunately attackers) have been finding in the
current browser security architecture.
We propose adding information flow controls to client-side Javascript through
PAP and use them to protect content displayed on a web page. We demonstrate
4
its usefulness in protecting content on the browser by incorporating PAP constructs
into the document object model(DOM) [13], which is an application programming
interface that defines how programs and scripts can access and update the content,
structure, and style of documents.
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CHAPTER 2
What is policy-agnostic programming?
Before we talk about policy-agnostic programming, we first need to give an
introduction to the domain it belongs to, i.e., information flow security.
2.1 A brief overview of information flow security
Information flow security is a security mechanism that consists of information
flow policies and information flow controls to detect and prevent leaking of sensitive
data by an application. Information flow policies here are the policies that define
where sensitive data can flow. Information flow controls are the mechanisms that
enforce them.
2.1.1 Basic principles of information flow security
When designing a system with information flow security, sensitive data needs to
be identified and corresponding information flow policies need to be defined. Smith [14]
talks about basic principles of information flow security that we mention here in brief.
Security labels
We assign security labels to variables according to the level of security they are
classified into. The most basic labels are L for low security or public information and
H for high security or private information; the goal is to prevent improper leaks of
information in H variables to L variables. The flow of data from an L variable into
an H variable is legal.
Explicit and implicit flow
In information flow security, the leak can be in terms of an explicit flow or an
implicit flow. The following is an example of an explicit flow where there is a direct
flow of data from an H variable to an L variable:
publicL = confidentialH
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The code-snippet below is an example of an implicit flow :
if (confidentialH % 2) == 0
publicL = 0
else
publicL = 1
Although it may not seem obvious that there is a leak of sensitive data in this example,
the last bit of the H variable (confidentialH) is being copied into the L variable
(publicL). Any case where there is a branching statement that depends on an H
variable has a potential data leak in terms of an implicit flow.
Noninterference
An important property in information flow security is noninterference. Smith [14]
defines a program satisfying noninterference as:
‘‘Program 𝑐 satisfies noninterference if, for any memories 𝜇 and 𝑣 that
agree on L variables, the memories produced by running 𝑐 on 𝜇 and on 𝑣
also agree on L variables (provided that both runs terminate successfully).’’
It is a formalization of the idea that a program should not leak information about H
(private) variables through L (public) variables. All systems that provide information
flow analysis need to prove noninterference. Although strict noninterference is not
desired since a real world system may need to change labels or declassify (downgrade
level of a variable) variables at runtime. One such relaxed form of noninterference is
termination-insensitive noninterference which still maintains the property of private
inputs not influencing public outputs on program execution although private infor-
mation can influence the termination of the program. Although the termination of a
program is a publicly observable fact, Askarov et al. [15] show that an attacker would
be reduced to using a brute force approach which would take more than polynomial
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time in the size of the sensitive data to exfiltrate.
Confidentiality and integrity
Information flow security is used to ensure confidentiality and integrity of data.
Our solution will mostly focus on confidentiality, but here we would briefly like to
define the two in the context of information flow security. Confidentiality as we
have described above ensures that there is no unwanted flow of information from
H variables into L variables. For example, you wouldn’t want to allow the flow of
data from a variable that contains credit card information into a variable that is
meant to store payment amount. Integrity introduces the concepts of tainted and
untainted variables. Variables that contain information received from an external
source (network or user input) are marked as tainted. Here the aim is to not allow
the flow of information from tainted variables into untainted variables. For example,
data in a tainted variable needs to be sanitized before it can be used as a parameter in
an SQL query or as part of a string that is used as input to the eval function. eval
is a Javascript function that takes Javascript code (in the form of a string) as input
and executes it.
2.1.2 Need for information flow security
Information flow analysis has seen very little adoption in commercial software
systems. A majority of these systems rely on standard security mechanisms like
access control, encryption, and firewalls. Sabelfeld and Myers [16] show how these
mechanisms fall short in completely preventing sensitive data leaks. Access control is
an important part of any security infrastructure that is used to control access of data
to legitimate users, but once access is granted, there is no way to control how the
data is used. Similarly, encryption will ensure that data will remain confidential while
in transit between two end-points but once the data is decrypted at the receiving
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end, there is no way to control the flow of data from that point onwards. A similar
argument can be made for firewalls.
Yang [17] in her blog post talks about a very popular privacy leak in recent times
that involved FBI director James Comey’s ‘‘secret’’ Twitter account being discovered
by Feinberg [18]. The leak was the result of an information flow vulnerability that
exists in Instagram. Feinberg found the private account of James Comey’s son Brian
Comey. Ideally, a private account’s ‘‘following’’ list should not be available to an
external observer which is the case in a normal flow. But, when Feinberg requested
to follow Brian’s account, Instagram’s ‘‘helpful’’ recommendation algorithm presented
a list of suggested accounts to follow. All of them included the other Comey family
members except for one account with an unusual name (‘‘reinholdniebuhr’’). With
some online research, Feinberg was able to figure out that James Comey had written
a thesis on ‘‘Reinhold Niebuhr’’ in law school. She found a Twitter account with the
same name and verified that it was in fact his account due to a public statement he
made specifying the number of people his ‘‘secret’’ Twitter account was following.
While Instagram does protect the identity of users who wish to remain private, it does
not prevent how their recommendation algorithms make use of this private data. The
result of computations done by these algorithms is not protected which is what led to
the leak in this particular case. Note: While Instagram was not directly responsible
for this leak, Feinberg did exploit this undetected implicit flow that resulted in her
findings.
2.1.3 Language based information flow security
There have been several approaches that researchers have tried to deal with the
problem of information flow security, primarily categorized into static and dynamic
analysis [19, 20]. In recent years, a lot of the research has been focussed on language-
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based approaches with the objective of making information flow security a part of
the programming language used for development. These are mostly extensions to
existing programming languages that provide constructs to define labels, to specify
policies, and to check those policies. As Sabelfeld and Myers [16] discuss, the use of
type systems for information flow analysis presents a promising approach to get a
practical implementation of information flow control. Here, every expression has a
security type with two parts: an ordinary type and a label that describes how the
value may be used. It is the job of the compiler to perform type checking; whenever a
program containing labelled types is read, the compiler also makes sure that there
will be no illegal flow of information at run-time. The authors call such a type system
that enforces information flow policies a security-type system.
Jif (Java + information flow) is an example of a language with a security-type
system [21], it extends Java with information flow controls and access controls that
are enforced at compile-time and run-time. It is based on the JFlow language [22],
which is the first usable programming model that provided static information flow
analysis.
The programming model introduced with Jif provides a robust set of features
along with the ability to specify information flow policies that are enforced by the
Jif compiler, but it is still not adopted in many practical, real-world systems. This
is largely due to the fact that a programmer must still have policy checking logic
all over the program whenever a sensitive value is used. When access to a sensitive
value is forbidden by a policy and the programmer has not handled such cases, the
program is likely to behave in an unexpected manner or get stuck. As Yang puts
it in her thesis [23], handling all cases where sensitive variables are used leads to
‘‘programmer burden from policy spaghetti’’. That is, using a system like Jif results
in policy checking logic scattered throughout the code. This leads to code that is
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difficult to maintain and prone to human error. Another problem is realized when
these policies need to be changed, which would mean changes everywhere the sensitive
variable is used.
2.2 The policy-agnostic programming model
In an attempt to make the implementation of information flow security more
flexible, Yang et al [1] introduced the policy-agnostic programming (PAP) model. PAP
is an approach where the developer only needs to focus on writing core functionality
without the additional burden of thinking about data privacy constraints on sensitive
values.
PAP is introduced using Jeeves, a domain specific language that provides con-
structs to define sensitive labels, policies, and to mark variables as sensitive. In Jeeves,
sensitive data has two views associated with it, a high confidentiality view and a low
confidentiality view. What view of the sensitive data is revealed to a particular output
channel depends on the context of the channel and the policy associated with the
sensitive data. Context here is an object that contains relevant information that a
policy may refer to. This can vary depending on the application. Austin et al [24]
provide an example of a context object for a health database application:
HealthContext {viewer: User, time: Date}
Here, the policies attached to sensitive variables will be resolved based on the user
who is trying to access a health record while time allows certain policies to define
expiration and activation times for visibility. The goal of PAP is that you define all
policies on sensitive values when they are defined. After this, everywhere the sensitive
value needs to be sent to an output channel, the language runtime is responsible for
enforcing and checking the policies associated with them.
The initial implementation of Jeeves involved symbolic execution and constraint
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solving to produce outputs adhering to the policies associated with sensitive data. This
approach had limitations in terms of implementation feasibility and expressiveness,
which were later addressed by extending it with faceted values [24]. The faceted
execution of policy-agnostic programs is based on work by Austin and Flanagan [25].
2.2.1 What is a faceted value?
A faceted value as defined in [25] is ‘‘a triple consisting of a principal 𝑘 and two
values 𝑉𝐻 and 𝑉𝐿.’’ It is represented as:
⟨𝑘 ? 𝑉𝐻 : 𝑉𝐿⟩
Here you can imagine the principal 𝑘 to be the owner/guard of the sensitive value.
The faceted value appears as 𝑉𝐻 (private facet) to private observers that are allowed
to view 𝑘’s private data, and as 𝑉𝐿 (public facet) to other public observers. In Jeeves,
principals of faceted values have policies associated with them which are rules that
the ‘‘guard’’ will check before providing access to the private facet. These policies
need not be checked till the value needs to be revealed to an output channel. So,
while faceted values are flowing through a program, there are special semantics that
define how they should be evaluated. The following is an example of a faceted value
that specifies a sensitive email address:
⟨𝑘 ? ‘jon@sjsu.edu’ : ‘[redacted]’⟩
When the policy associated with 𝑘 can be resolved to true, the value ‘jon@sjsu.edu’ is
visible and if the policy is resolved to false, then the value ‘[redacted]’ is visible.
2.2.2 Evaluation semantics of faceted values
The semantics of Jeeves are modeled using 𝜆𝑗𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 which is the core language
that extends the faceted execution semantics of Austin and Flanagan [25]. Figure 1
shows the 𝜆𝑗𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 language. Notable here are the faceted expressions, label declarations
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and policy specification expressions which help build policy agnostic programs. We
briefly discuss some of the faceted evaluation semantics to give a gist of a how a policy
agnostic program might behave in certain scenarios. In Chapter 3, we will talk about
the Jeeves constructs that enable PAP.
A program counter (pc) is used to track when program execution is being
influenced by a public or private facet. Any expression involving a faceted value
becomes a faceted expression. So if we have something like:
⟨𝑘 ? 𝑉𝐻 : 𝑉𝐿⟩ + 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟
This can be though of as the faceted expression:
⟨𝑘 ? 𝑉𝐻 + 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 : 𝑉𝐿 + 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟⟩
which is of the form:
⟨𝑘 ? 𝑒1 : 𝑒2⟩
The faceted evaluation semantics shown in Figure 2 defines [F-SPLIT] as the rule to
evaluate faceted expressions. Here, assuming neither 𝑘 nor 𝑘 are in the current pc,
we evaluate both expressions 𝑒1 and 𝑒2 one after the other. First, 𝑘 is added to pc to
obtain 𝑉1 from 𝑒1 and then 𝑘 is added to pc to obtain 𝑉2 from 𝑒2. Finally, we create
a new faceted value:
⟨𝑘 ? 𝑉1 : 𝑉2⟩
On the other hand, if the pc already contains either 𝑘 or 𝑘, then only one expression
is evaluated as defined in the rules [F-LEFT] and [F-RIGHT].
In Figure 3, the [F-IF-SPLIT] rule defines how a conditional statement is handled
for faceted values. Figure 4 shows a code snippet which has a potential to leak data
through an implicit flow. Line 8 defines a faceted value which is sent as input to the
function f. Line 3 has a conditional statement which is dependent on this faceted
13
Figure 1: The 𝜆𝑗𝑒𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑠 source language [24]
value. Here, the conditional statement would become a faceted expression of the
form <h? 25 > 0 : 0 > 0>. The [F-SPLIT] rule would be used to evaluate this
expression to <h?true:false>. Now, the [F-IF-SPLIT] rule would be used to evaluate
the if block from line 3 to line 5. First, ℎ is added to the pc to evaluate the if block
under the influence of the private facet which would be the assignment expression:
E1 = v1 := false. Next, the if block is evaluated under the influence of the public
facet by adding ℎ¯ to the pc. This would be a no-op since there is no else block. Note,
under the influence of the private facet, we assigned false to the variable v1 which
already had true assigned to it. At the end of evaluation of the if block, the final
value of v1 is <h?false:true>.
The faceted evaluation semantics of Jeeves gives it a few desirable properties;
14
Figure 2: Faceted evaluation semantics [24]
Figure 3: Semantics of Derived Encodings [24]
the projection property which states that a single execution with faceted val-
ues can be projected onto multiple different executions without faceted values, the
termination-insensitive noninterference (the projection property helps to prove this),
and termination-insensitive policy compliance which states that data is revealed to an
15
1 function f(val) {
2 var v1 = true;
3 if (val > 0) {
4 v1 = false;
5 }
6 return v1;
7 }
8 var f1 = <h?25:0 >;
9 f(f1);
Figure 4: Faceted Evaluation of a potential implicit flow
external observer only if it is allowed by the policy specified in the program.
2.2.3 The Jacqueline Framework
Yang et al. [2] demonstrate the practical feasibility of the policy-agnostic pro-
gramming paradigm for database-backed server-side applications. They introduce
Jacqueline, an MVC framework with an aim to provide a platform to easily implement
information flow security in server side applications. Figure 5 shows a snippet of a
‘‘Model’’ definition in Jacqueline, how a sensitive value is defined, and what a policy
looks like. Here, project_name is the field we are marking as sensitive by using the an-
notation @label_for. The method jeeves_restrict_projectlabel defines the pol-
icy which is a boolean function while the method jeeves_get_private_project_name
defines the public facet of the sensitive value. In jeeves_restrict_projectlabel,
ctxt is the context object representing the output channel which in the case of this
application is the currently logged-in user. Once the policy for a sensitive variable
is defined, the programmer need not worry about where or how they are using this
value; the Jeeves runtime will take care of any potential leaks and the policy is only
resolved when the value is going out to an output channel like the client-side.
As seen in the example above, the Jeeves runtime in the Jacqueline framework
took care of information flow control and resolved the policy for sensitive data only
when going out to the browser. But, once data is on the browser, the concept of
16
1 class Project(JacquelineModel):
2 project_name = models.CharField(max_length = 128)
3 code_name = models.CharField(max_length = 128)
4 start_date = models.DateTimeField(’date started ’)
5 end_date = models.DateTimeField(’date ended’)
6 department = ForeignKey(Department , on_delete=models.CASCADE)
7
8 @staticmethod
9 def jeeves_get_private_project_name(project):
10 return project.code_name
11
12 @staticmethod
13 @label_for(’project_name ’)
14 @jeeves
15 def jeeves_restrict_projectlabel(project , ctxt):
16 return project.department == ctxt.department
Figure 5: Model definition in the Jacqueline framework
facets is lost. However, we may want to further protect our data against exfiltration
attacks. This is where our solution would help by persisting faceted values and policies
associated with them on the client-side.
2.3 Related Work
Austin and Flanagan’s [25] original work showed the benefits of faceted values for
dynamic information flow control by giving an example of how it could help reduce
the power of an XSS attack. Rajani et al. [26] implement information flow controls
for event handling and the DOM API which is based on work done by Bichhawat
et al. [27] in which they build information flow controls into the WebKit Javascript
engine. The drawback of both these approaches is that when an information flow
control is violated, the execution is halted which may not be desirable for dynamic
web pages.
Koskela et al. [28] present an interesting approach to browser security by present-
ing an actor based approach where the various content providers (actors) that make
up a web page are accountable for the content they send. They confine each actor
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within a <div> tag and based on their track record, the user/browser can decide how
much restriction to enforce on a particular <div> node.
Policy agnostic programming along with faceted values provides a very flexible
approach (which is desirable on the client-side) to information flow control while still
providing strong guarantees. We discuss more about our solution in Chapter 3 along
with a demonstration of how it would help protect browser content.
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CHAPTER 3
Implementing policy-agnostic programming on the client side
We incorporated policy-agnostic programming into Javascript by adding con-
structs defined for the Jeeves language as a subsystem1. We chose Narcissus [29], a
Javascript interpreter written in Javascript, to create the proof of concept. Narcissus
was built by its developers to be able to prototype new language features for Javascript.
3.1 Implementing faceted values in Narcissus
The implementation of faceted values is integral to implementing Jeeves. Our
implementation of faceted values derives heavily from the work done by Austin and
Flanagan [25] and is inspired from the concept presented by Kerchove et al. [30] for
‘‘modular instrumentation’’ of interpreters. They talk about how many dynamic anal-
ysis approaches for information flow security have prototypes that are implemented
in very specific ways making it difficult to compare and reuse. They derive some
specific criteria to follow in order to achieve ‘‘modular instrumentation’’ using the
implementation [31] of faceted values [25] as a case study. While we borrow a few
ideas from this, our implementation does not follow the criteria specified because
achieving ‘‘modular instrumentation’’ would involve non-trivial changes to the Nar-
cissus interpreter making it out of scope for our problem. What we did achieve is
the untangling of the concerns of the core interpreter for non-faceted evaluation from
the concerns of faceted evaluation. This makes it easier to relate principles of faceted
evaluation with the implemented prototype and also to extend or reuse it.
Our implementation of faceted values is independent from the core Narcissus
interpreter. This involved making the core interpreter modular to be able to modify
existing evaluation mechanisms to behave differently for faceted values. The Narcissus
interpreter has an execute function that consists of a switch case control flow that is
1The code is available at: https://github.com/kushalpalesha/narcissus
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set to perform the appropriate set of operations based on the type of node identified
by the parser. Wherever there is need for faceted behavior, instead of making the
core interpreter code handle faceted behavior, we moved the part we would need to
change into a function and later override it to handle the faceted behavior. Figure 6
shows how this overriding is implemented for the [F-IF-SPLIT] evaluation rule. Here,
BaseExecContext is an object that stores a copy of all the fucntions from the core
interpreter which we need to override. ExecutionContext is an object from the core
interpreter that keeps track of the current flow of execution. FacetExecContext is
the ExecutionContext object extended with the pc to help keep track of the influence
of public or private facets on the current flow of execution. In the evalIfBlock
function, notice we call the base evalIfBlock function if cond is not a faceted value.
Otherwise, we call the evaluateEach function which implements the [FA-SPLIT] rules
from Figure 7. We override behavior of the rest of the functions in BaseExecContext
in a similar manner.
3.2 Implementing Jeeves
Once we had faceted values working, adding support for Jeeves constructs was
pretty straightforward. All of the Jeeves constructs are encapsulated in the prototype
of the PolicyEnvironment object which includes the [F-LABEL] and [F-RESTRICT]
evaluation rules as shown in Figure 8. Every instance of the PolicyEnvironment
object has a policyMap that is used to store the ‘label’:‘policy’ mapping.
The Jeeves constructs available in the PolicyEnvironment prototype are:
1. mkLabel: This function is roughly based on the [F-LABEL] rule. It creates a
label and associates a default true policy to it.
2. restrict: This function associates the given policy function to the given label
in the policyMap of the current PolicyEnvironment.
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1 var BaseExecContext = {
2 getValue : interpreter.ExecutionContext.prototype.getValue ,
3 putValue : interpreter.ExecutionContext.prototype.putValue ,
4 evalBinOp : interpreter.ExecutionContext.prototype.evalBinOp ,
5 evalUnaryOp : interpreter.ExecutionContext.prototype.evalUnaryOp ,
6 evalIfBlock : interpreter.ExecutionContext.prototype.evalIfBlock ,
7 evalDot : interpreter.ExecutionContext.prototype.evalDot ,
8 evalFunctionCall : interpreter.ExecutionContext.prototype.
evalFunctionCall ,
9 runWhileLoop : interpreter.ExecutionContext.prototype.runWhileLoop
10 };
11
12 FacetExecContext.prototype.evalIfBlock = function(cond ,thenPart ,
elsePart) {
13 var execContext = FacetExecContext.current;
14 if (cond instanceof FacetedValue) {
15 evaluateEach(cond , function(v, x) {
16 if (v) {
17 interpreter.execute(thenPart , x);
18 } else if (elsePart) {
19 interpreter.execute(elsePart , x);
20 }
21 }, execContext);
22 } else {
23 BaseExecContext.evalIfBlock.call(this ,cond ,thenPart ,elsePart);
24 }
25 };
Figure 6: Independent implementation of faceted behavior for the ‘‘if’’ control flow
Figure 7: Function application rules [24]
3. mkSensitive: This function creates a faceted value. It takes the label, private
value, and public value as input and returns a faceted value. This function
would only return the private value or the public value in cases where the current
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Figure 8: Evaluation semantics for Jeeves labels and policies [24]
program counter contains the label or reverse of the label respectively.
4. concretize: This function is used when the faceted value needs to be viewed
in an output context. It takes the context object and faceted value as input and
resolves the policies for all labels in the program counter of the faceted value
recursively till it reaches a raw value with no facets.
5. partialConcretize: Partial concretize is similar to the concretize function
except it only resolves the policy associated with the first label of a possibly
complex faceted value based on the given context object. Figure 9 shows what
the concretize and partialConcretize functions look like.
3.2.1 Using Jeeves constructs
Figure 10 shows two test cases of how the Jeeves constructs listed above would
be used. Note, policyEnv is an instance of the PolicyEnvironment prototype.
In testPolicyComplexFacets, we are constructing complex faceted values with
two principals/labels and have two different policies for each respectively. The call to
concretize at the end shows what a context object would look like in this case. The
faceted value stored in a in notation looks like this: ⟨𝑥 ? ⟨𝑦 ?10 : 15⟩ : 0⟩.
In testPartialConcretize, we are using partialConcretize with two different
context objects. This type of usage would be ideal for a client-server interaction where
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1 function concretize(context , val) {
2 if (val instanceof FacetedValue) {
3 var label = head(val);
4 var policy = this.policyMap[label];
5 if (policy(context)) {
6 return this.concretize(context , val.high);
7 } else {
8 return this.concretize(context , val.low);
9 }
10 } else {
11 return val;
12 }
13 }
14 function partialConcretize(context , val) {
15 if (val instanceof FacetedValue) {
16 var label = head(val);
17 var policy = this.policyMap[label];
18 if (policy(context)) {
19 val = val.high;
20 } else {
21 val = val.low;
22 }
23 }
24 return val;
25 }
Figure 9: Concretize and partialConcretize function definitions
you can have different context objects for the server and client-side respectively. Note:
in the example, the policies associated with the two labels are expecting different
properties in the context object passed to them.
3.3 Policy agnostic programming in dom.js
Web browsers have an implementation of the DOM to allow scripts to access
and manipulate content. We add faceted values and policy-agnostic programming
constructs to the DOM implementation to show how it can be used to prevent sensitive
data from leaking.
We use dom.js [32], which is a DOM implementation written in Javascript. This
makes it possible for us to parse it using Narcissus and make DOM components
available to scripts just like a web browser would. The advantages of using dom.js
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1 function () testPolicyComplexFacets{
2 var x = policyEnv.mkLabel("x");
3 policyEnv.restrict(x, function (context) {
4 return context.val1 === 22 && context.val2 === 21;
5 });
6
7 var y = policyEnv.mkLabel("y");
8 policyEnv.restrict(y, function (context) {
9 return context.val2 === 22;
10 });
11 var a = policyEnv.mkSensitive(x, policyEnv.mkSensitive(y, 10, 15),
0);
12 return assertEquals(policyEnv.concretize ({val1: 22, val2: 21}, a),
15);
13 };
14
15 function testPartialConcretize () {
16 var x = policyEnv.mkLabel("x");
17 policyEnv.restrict(x, function (context) {
18 return context.val1 === 22 && context.val2 === 21;
19 });
20
21 var y = policyEnv.mkLabel("y");
22 policyEnv.restrict(y, function (context) {
23 return context.otherVal = 44;
24 });
25 var a = policyEnv.mkSensitive(x, policyEnv.mkSensitive(y, 10, 15),
0);
26
27 var result1 = assertEquals(policyEnv.partialConcretize ({val1: 22,
val2: 21}, b).toString (), "{y?10:15}");
28 var result2 = assertEquals(policyEnv.partialConcretize ({val:22}, b
), 0);
29 return result2 && result1;
30 };
Figure 10: Example usage of Jeeves constructs
is highlighted by Austin et al. [33, Section 9.3] since it makes it possible to include
faceted values in the DOM and track flow of private information on the web browser.
We first identify the entry and exit points in the DOM that have the potential to
leak sensitive data such as when the setAttribute and getAttribute functions of
an element are called; when a Text node is created and appended to a DOM and when
the innerHTML property of an element is used to access the text within an element;
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and finally when an XMLHttpRequest is made to load an external script, image, or
other media.
Note here, the setAttribute function and creation of the textNode are entry
points into the DOM. Here, we have to be careful not to render sensitive information
onto unwanted components like the src attribute of an image or script tag. We discuss
such a scenario in Section 3.4. On the other hand, once a value is rendered onto the
DOM, a script may try to access rendered values using the getAttribute function
and the innerHTML property.
We introduce an instance of the PolicyEnvironment prototype to the window
object. This gives access to Jeeves constructs within the DOM along with a policyMap
for each web page. We also introduce a facetedValueMap available as a global store
that associates textNodes or attributes of elements with corresponding faceted values.
The facetedValueMap is of type WeakMap that provides a loose mapping from objects
to values [34].
Figure 12 shows how creation of a text node for faceted values is handled within
the DOM. The function createTextNode creates a node that would eventually be
rendered onto a web page. At this point, we need to decide which facet of a faceted
value should be rendered. If the input to createTextNode() is faceted, then we
concretize that value to get a raw value to be rendered. Note, in the concretize
function we do not specify what the context object looks like. We talk about
this in detail in Section 3.5. Additionally, we add the faceted value itself to the
facetedValueMap with the textNode as key. We have added similar code in the
setAttribute function of an element with one distinction to the object that is used
as key for the facetedValueMap. Here we cannot use the node as the key since we
need to have different keys for different attributes of an element. So, we created an
object using the id of the element and the attribute name as follows:
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1 // Convert the children of a node to an HTML string.
2 // This is used by the innerHTML getter
3 serialize: constant(function () {
4 var s = "";
5 for(var i = 0, n = this.childNodes.length; i < n; i++) {
6 var kid = this.childNodes[i];
7 if (kid in facetedValueMap) {
8 return facetedValueMap[kid];
9 }
10 .
11 .
12 .
13 }
14 .
15 .
16 .
17 }
Figure 11: Return faceted value if exists when the innerHTML property is accessed
1 createTextNode: function createTextNode(data) {
2 var dataString = data;
3 var dataIsFaceted = isFaceted(data);
4 if (dataIsFaceted) {
5 dataString = window.policyEnv.concretize ({...} , data);
6 }
7 var textNode = unwrap(this).createTextNode(String(dataString));
8 if (dataIsFaceted) facetedValueMap[textNode] = data;
9 return wrap(textNode);
10 },
Figure 12: Persisting faceted values for createTextNode
facetedValueMap[{id:this.id, attr:attributeName}] = value;
Figure 11 shows how access to the innerHTML property of an element would
return a faceted value instead of the actual content that was rendered on the web
page (lines 7-9). Note that serialize is a function called by the innerHTML getter.
We have similar code to return a faceted value in the getAttribute function of an
element with the key as shown above for the setAttribute function.
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3.4 A data exfiltration case study
We present a simple data exfiltration attack that succeeds in exfiltrating sensitive
data from the a web page to a server that the attacker owns. A direct XMLHttpRequest
to do this would be prevented by the same-origin policy of the web browser, but there
is a simple workaround. The same-origin policy does not restrict the source of a script
or image tag. Although you may use CSP (see Section 1.1.1) to restrict sources, it
becomes difficult to track what image sources to allow and so web developers tend to
keep the CSP of img-src as a wildcard (*), allowing all urls for images.
Figure 13 shows a screenshot of a simple web page we created that shows the
salary of the user currently logged-in and salaries of his subordinates. The helpful
greeting at the top right corner along with the nice background color is a due to
a third-party library that Trudy suggested would be a nice addition to make the
otherwise mundane user interface better. It turns out the third-party library also does
some malicious activity along with these ‘‘colorful’’ additions. Figure 14 shows the
code of the third party library. Here, lines 14-15 would get the message that displays
Manny’s salary. Lines 17-20 extract Manny’s name and salary and line 21 would result
in an attempt to asynchronously load an image with the name ‘‘Manny_10000.jpg’’
from ‘‘localhost:8081’’2 which is not the same as the origin of the web page as shown
in the address bar in Figure 13. This would happen anytime Manny clicks anywhere
on the web page. Now, although there is no image with the name ‘‘Manny_10000.jpg’’
at ‘‘localhost:8081’’, the attacker can access Manny’s salary by checking their http
access logs, as shown in Figure 15.
Now let us look at how policy-agnostic programming controls in the DOM would
prevent such an attack. Figure 16 shows a code snippet of the code that would display
a message similar to the one shown in Figure 13. Note, the string concatenation on
2Here, we are using a different port number to stand in for an alternate url such as ‘‘evil.com’’
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Figure 13: Web page that displays employee salaries
1 var d = new Date();
2 var time = d.getHours ();
3 var greetingNode = document.getElementById("greeting");
4 var message = "Good day!";
5 document.body.style.fontStyle.color = "black";
6 //This section sets background color and greeting based on the time
7 .
8 .
9 var welcomeText = document.createTextNode(message);
10 greetingNode.appendChild(welcomeText);
11 // Malicious code:
12 document.addEventListener("click", function () {
13 var salaryField = document.getElementById("OwnSalary");
14 var text = salaryField.innerHTML;
15 var malImg = document.createElement("img");
16 var commaPos = text.indexOf(",");
17 var dollarPos = text.indexOf("$");
18 var name = text.slice(3,commaPos);
19 var salary = text.slice(dollarPos +1);
20 var imgName = name + "_" + salary + ".jpg";
21 malImg.setAttribute("src","http :// localhost :8081/" + imgName);
22 //The following would violate the same origin policy:
23 //$.post(’http :// localhost :8081/ exfil.php ’,{message:text});
24 });
Figure 14: Third Party library with exfiltration code
line 4 would produce a faceted value of the form:
<"n"? <"s"?"Manny’s Salary is:10000":"Manny’s Salary is:0">:
<"s"?"JonDoe’s Salary is:10000":"JonDoe’s Salary is:0"> >
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Figure 15: Access log entry giving Manny’s salary information to the attacker
1 var domPolicyEnv = window.policyEnv;
2 var fName = domPolicyEnv.mkSensitive("n", "Manny", "JonDoe");
3 var fSalary = domPolicyEnv.mkSensitive("s" ,10000, 0);
4 document.body.appendChild(document.createTextNode(fName + "’s Salary
is:" + fSalary));
Figure 16: Code that would set the display message on the web page
Now, when the code from Figure 14 is run, the concatenation on line 21 would produce
a faceted value of the form:
<"n"? <"s"?"Manny_10000.jpg":"Manny_0.jpg">:
<"s"?"JonDoe_10000.jpg":"JonDoe_0.jpg"> >
So, with the correct policies in place (see Section3.5), the message displayed on the
web page would be ‘‘Manny’s Salary is:10000’’ and the image request would be for
‘‘JonDoe_0.jpg’’.
3.5 The context object and defining policies
In Section 2.2 we briefly touched upon the definition of a context object and
what it might look like in a health database application. Here, we define what a
context object would look like for our case study above and how it would be used by
policy functions. A context object contains all information that is relevant to define
the ‘‘context’’ of the output channel and varies based on the output channel. For
instance, the context object when an image load request is made by the browser could
be defined as:
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{time: new Date(), elementType: "img"}
When defining a policy for a sensitive value, the designer/developer needs to be aware
of where it is expected to flow to. A good approach to creating a policy is identifying
the two kinds of output channels: one where we expect our data to flow to, and the
other where we definitely do not want the data to leak to. For the channels where we
expect the data to flow to, we identify conditions under which we would allow the
private facet to be sent out. For all other cases, we allow only the public facet to be
seen. How you define a policy completely depends on your application and the data
you are trying to protect. In our example, we do not expect salaries to be used in
the image tag among other conditions so we need to define the policy accordingly.
Figure 17 shows what that policy might look like. Here, we specify three conditions:
one which defines we do not want salary data to flow to the image or script tag; the
second one specifies that any attempt to render or use salary data past 6:00 pm would
not be allowed; the third specifies the only condition in which salary data is allowed
to be rendered. Notice, in the third condition we are looking for an attribute that
is not part of the context object we have specified above. When createTextNode is
called the context object would look like the following:
{time: new Date(), URL:mycorp.org/salaryManager.php}
With this context, assuming time is less than 6:00 pm, and the policy in Figure 17,
the private facet will be rendered to the Text node.
3.6 Client-server interaction with policy-agnostic programming
Since we have seen the uses of policy-agnostic programming on both the server
(see Section 2.2.3) and client-side (see Section 3.3) we should talk about how we
imagine they would interact with each other. First thing to note is that policies on
the server-side would not be relevant to the client-side and vice-versa. This is mostly
30
1 function (ctxt) {
2 if (ctxt.elementType && ctxt.elementType == "img" || ctxt.
elementType == "script") {
3 return false;
4 } else if (ctxt.time && ctxt.time.getHours () > 18) {
5 return false;
6 } else if (ctxt.URL && ctxt.URL == "mycorp.org/salaryManager.php")
{
7 return true;
8 }
9 return false;
10 }
Figure 17: Example of a policy function for the salary faceted value
due to the fact the output context in both cases will be different and the kind of
information leaks they are trying to prevent will also be different. To visualize this
notion, we present an example that demonstrates the interaction of faceted values
between the server and client-side. Suppose, the server of an application stores location
information of a user as a faceted value of the form:
<"serverlabel"?
<"clientlabel"?"Psychiatric center, 4th St.":"Bermuda triangle">:
<"clientlabel"?"Doctor’s office":"Bermuda triangle">
Note, the policy function for ‘‘serverlabel’’ would be in the policyEnvironment
of the server, while the policy function for the ‘‘clientlabel’’ would be in the
policyEnvironment of the client. When the location data is to be sent to a client, the
context object here would be the currently logged in user and the policy function could
be defined such that only the Doctor of the user is able to access the private facet
while other users would get access to the public facet. Here, the partialConcretize
function from Section 3.2 would be useful since we do not want to concretize to a
raw value. We will have different policies on the client side that define what facet is
rendered on the browser.
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CHAPTER 4
Future Work and Conclusion
We explored the use of policy-agnostic programming in the DOM. Another
interesting area to explore on the client-side would be frameworks like Angular.js
(angular). Since, angular is an MVC framework, the policy-agnostic programming
solution for it should be similar to what Yang et al. [2] have demonstrated with
Jacqueline.
We saw how robust information flow controls can help prevent leaking of sensitive
data and how it has seen very slow adoption because of the programmer burden to
write and maintain policy code. Policy-agnostic programming is a promising approach
to implement information flow controls in your system with very limited programmer
burden.
We explored how policy agnostic programming would look like on the client-side.
Through our Javascript implementation in Narcissus and dom.js we were successful
in demonstrating how it helped prevent a known exfiltration attack to which most
modern browsers are vulnerable.
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